An Open Letter to the President and the Secretary of State against Military Aid to Colombia
from the Committees of Correspondence for Democracy and Socialism

Dear President Clinton and Secretary Albright:

We ask you to reconsider the Administration’s plan to give $1.6 billion in (primarily military) aid to Colombia as the first installment of a larger amount of military aid. We think this is a bad idea for the following reasons: 1) The Colombian military has ties to paramilitary groups guilty of gross human rights violations; 2) A military solution to the supply side of the drug problem is ineffective due to the demand for drugs in the U.S. and so is a misuse of money better spent on the demand side; 3) The lack of alternative options for peasant farmers in Colombia makes growing cocoa a more attractive crop but drug eradication efforts do not address this fundamental problem of poverty and so is also a misuse of funds better spent on alternative development; and 4) An escalation of the war will destabilize the peace process and involve the U.S. in a counter-insurgency war.

According to your January 11, 2000 statement on "U.S. Assistance to Colombia," you say that the assistance is to counter drug-trafficking and that, "as a matter of both policy and law, we will ensure that our assistance does not go to military units that have been implicated in abuses," but we have seen various reports that "Clinton aides privately admit that there will be no way to separate the war on drugs from the war on the guerrillas" (Time, March 6, 2000, 54-55). And that, "United States officials are clearly softening their positions that American aid will not be used for counterinsurgency.". . . . "Anyone who believes that these counternarcotics battalions will not be involved in counter-insurgency is naive" (New York Times 2/26/2000). Further, "The main purpose of the proposed American aid is to train and equip three new army battalions to wrest military control of the southern cocoa-growing areas from the FARC." The backers of the aid present this as a plan to fight drugs, but "in practice, the new battalions’ target will be the FARC" (The Economist, March 4-10, 2000). And, according to the Colombia Report 1999 of Human Rights Watch, the primary objective of the new 950-person counternarcotics battalion, "according to U.S. officials, was to regain guerrilla-controlled territory."

It has been also been reported (Tim Golden, New York Times, January 26, 2000) that 80% of the 1.6 billion in aid will be for military purposes, whether for Colombian security forces [New York Times (February 6, 2000)], or to pay for military hardware and intervention [Time magazine (March 6, 2000, p. 54-55]. Indeed according to the White House press release "Fact Sheet" of January 11, 2000 on "Colombia Assistance Package," more money will go to military spending than alternative development strategies.

While those in the Administration, such as Generals Charles Wilhelm and Barry R. McCaffrey, who support military aid to Colombia to counter the drug war do so under the simplistic equation of guerrillas equal drug traffickers, the situation is more complex. The guerrillas profit by taxing the drug traffickers, but it is the paramilitaries guilty of human rights abuses that are directly tied to the traffickers. The Colombian military has been fighting guerrillas with the help of paramilitary groups responsible for gross human rights violations according to Human Rights Watch. Between 1988 and 1995 there were 67,378 victims of political violence in Colombian averaging 701.9 per month or 23.4 per day. According to the School of Americas Watch, 1.5 million people have been displaced since 1985 in a refugee crisis greater than Kosovo’s and the third largest in the world. Political violence caused 300,000 Colombians to flee their homes last year alone according to The Economist, and 800,00 in the last four years. SOA Watch reports that while the guerrillas commit some serious violations, 78% of human rights violations are committed by the paramilitaries (70% according to State Department reports); 20% by the guerrillas and 2% by the military. But the latter 2% figure is misleading. The army has extensive links with the paramilitary forces at the local and regional level and some army officers facilitate the work of the paramilitaries or look the other way as violence occurs.

Human Rights watch has said in the last couple weeks that at least half of Colombia’s 18 army brigades have continuing links to the paramilitaries, according to The Economist (2/26/2000). The Human Rights Watch Report of February 23, 2000 states that there are continuing ties between the Colombian Army and paramilitary groups. Paramilitaries operate in coordination with the military. The military shares intelligence, plans and carries out joint operations, provides weapons and munitions, provides support with helicopters and medical aid, and coordinates with the paramilitaries on a daily basis, according to the SOA Watch. Human Rights Watch gives an example of how Colombia is able to claim the human rights violations have decreased: "Repeatedly, paramilitaries killed those suspected of supporting guerrillas, then delivered the corpses to the army. In a process known as ‘legalization,’ the army then claimed the dead as guerrillas killed in combat while paramilitaries received their pay in army weapons."

The 1993 human rights report State Terrorism in Colombia cites 247 Colombian officers for human rights violations. And according to a U.S. State Department report, Gen. Farouk Uanine Diaz, was accused of "establishing and expanding paramilitary death squads, as well as ordering dozens of disappearances, and the killing of judges and court personnel sent to investigate previous crimes." Some of the more heinous massacres include the 1988 massacre in Segovia in which 43 people were killed, the Trujillo chainsaw massacres, which took place between 1988 and 1991, and the 1993 Riofrio massacre. Even in the context of 40 years of civil war, the first two months of this year were frightening. Paramilitary death squads killed over 140 people in several days in January alone. The 45th battalion has been guilty of bombing and machine-gunning of civilians and the disappearances of peasant leaders. The third brigade has also set up paramilitary fronts that have engaged in kidnapping and murder. Yet, President Andres Pastrana has said (Washington Post, February 6, B-5), that "In 1996, the military was accused of 2,000 human rights violations. Last year there were not more than 70. So, I think we are starting to do a good job." And, in his recent visit to the U.S., President Pastrana asked that U.S. aid not be tied to his government’s progress on human rights (Tim Golden, NYT, 1/26/2000), even though this would be illegal in virtue of the Leahy Amendment.

Another U.S. State Department Report on Colombia (in 1998) states that the 20th military brigade was disbanded for its involvement in human rights abuses, including the targeted killing of civilians. Yet, some 250-300 U.S. military personnel are on the ground in Colombia on a typical day and now the U.S. wants to create a three new battalions to operate on the ground in Colombia. The Economist questions the advisability of committing $1.6 billion to such an ambiguous purpose. "The American proposal looks as if it will merely bolt three shiny new anti-drug battalions on to an abusive and unreformed military force." Colombia is already the third largest recipient of U.S. military aid. We don’t want U.S. tax dollars going to militaries guilty of egregious human rights abuses such as those the State Department reported going on in Colombia in 1998.

We disagree with the policy of military aid to Colombia for the purpose of fighting the drug traffickers on other grounds as well. There are two roots of the problem that it does not address. The first is in the U.S. The war on drugs has been shown to be ineffective up to now due to the demand in the U.S. As President Pastrana has said, "We could finish the business, but if you still have big demand in the United States, someone is going to fill that market." Military spending does not stem the drug epidemic. Despite a 17-fold increase in U.S. drug war spending since 1980, illicit drugs are now cheaper, more potent and more easily available than when the "war on drugs" began. It is throwing good money after bad. As Michael Massing pointed out in his Washington Post article (February 6, 2000, B5), "Over the last 10 years, the federal government has spent about $150 billion to combat drugs," but it has not made much difference. The money would be better spent on treatment centers in the U.S. and alternative crop development in Colombia. To cite The Economist, "This is a war that will not be won with helicopters."

A military solution to the drug problem does not get at the second root of the problem either–the inequitable distribution of land and the need for alternative development in Colombia. In Colombia, the top three percent of the landed elite own over 70% of arable land while 57% of the poorest farmers subsist on under 3%. This is why there are guerillas and why the farmers have to resort to growing drugs. A peasant farmer makes only $250 per year growing legitimate crops, but can make $2000 per year growing cocoa and so can feed his family. President Pastrana has said as much. The guerrillas told him the were willing to eradicate drugs, but that they needed "money to invest in alternative development." He said, "if we could create new business in these areas, we could eradicate drugs." So, purchasing 30 new Black Hawk helicopters at more than $10 million apiece and 33 old Huey helicopters that don’t work, is a waste of U.S. tax dollars. Tim Golden’s piece in the New York Times (Feb. 6, 2000) suggests that there are other solutions that cost little or no money, such as "taking cellular telephones away from jailed traffickers so they cannot operate from prison."

Another reason the military solution to the drug problem is a bad idea, is that the Colombian people do not support it. In October 1999, an astonishing 10 million Colombians marched for peace, calling for an end to violence from all sides. The U.S. can help by positive uses of aid, which would include: relief aid for people displaced by violence; crop substitution for small farmers to switch from coca to legal crops; programs to strengthen government investigations into human rights violations; and aid for civil society peace and human rights initiatives.

Finally, an increase in U.S. military presence and spending will have the effect of destabilizing the peace process and escalating the war. The FARC has greeted the "Colombia Plan" as a declaration of war by the U.S. The ordinary people of Colombia view it the same way. "The whole country is going to be a war zone" (NYT, 3/5/2000). It will end the peace negotiations and re-ignite the war. It appears that the Colombian military is not really for the peace process since it would leave the guerrillas in control of some land, but the Colombian military can’t win--thus opening the door for greater U.S. involvement. Already this past July, the U.S. began sharing intelligence on guerrillas with the Colombian military, a further entanglement in the war. The July 23 crash of a U.S. Army RC-7B DeHavilland intelligence-gathering aircraft killing five American and two Colombian officers, underscored the rapidly escalating U.S. involvement. The numbers of U.S. special forces such as Green Berets increased in 1999 from 24 to 30. We also understand that a U.S. forward operations base with an airfield will be built on the Colombia-Ecuador border which will support reconnaissance and intelligence gathering. The Pastrana government is for a peaceful solution since it believes the military can’t win, but the intervention of the U.S. into the situation changes the equation by bolstering the military and inflaming the conflict. It also opens the door to greater U.S. involvement in the future. Neither the guerrillas nor the military will win, but the renewed fighting will destroy the peace negotiations and lessen the likelihood of future talks. In two years, the money will be gone, the fighting will intensify, the United States will have increased its commitment both in money and assets in the field with little to show for it, and so will be forced to send more money or troops–or both. As the January 15, 2000 issue of The Economist pointed out, "The current anti-narcotics battalion has been trained in counter-insurgency. . . . which means, in turn, that the Americans will be increasingly dragged into Colombia’s civil war."

In view of all these reasons, we ask you to look for other than military solutions to the complex problem of drugs. We especially do not want to see the U.S. military become involved in a counter-insurgency war in Colombia. Negotiations are the path to peace, not increased military spending.

The letter was dated March 24, 2000, and signed by the Co-chairs of the CofC: Leslie Cagan, Manning Marable, Charlene Mitchell, Eric Quezada, and Mark Solomon.

People are urged to make their individual protests to President Clinton, Secretary of State Albright and to their Congressional representatives.